Michigan Law Review
Volume 46

Issue 6

1948

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW--COMMERCE CLAUSE--FOREIGN
COMMERCE--VALIDITY OF STATE STATUTE PROHIBITING RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION BY CARRIER
Bruce L. Moore S.Ed.
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, and the Law and
Race Commons

Recommended Citation
Bruce L. Moore S.Ed., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW--COMMERCE CLAUSE--FOREIGN COMMERCE--VALIDITY OF
STATE STATUTE PROHIBITING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION BY CARRIER, 46 MICH. L. REV. 826 (1948).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol46/iss6/9

This Regular Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

CoNsTITUTIONAL LAw-CoMMERCE CLAusE-FoREIGN CoMMERCEVALIDITY OF STATE STATUTE PROHIBITING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION BY
CARRIER-Appellant owns and operates two steamships for transportation of
its patrons between Detroit and Bois Blanc Island, part of the Province of
Ontario, Canada. The island is owned by appellant and operated as an amusement and recreation center for the people of Detroit.1 For refusal to transport
a negro girl, appellant was prosecuted and convicted under the Michigan Civil
Rights Act 2 which provides that "All persons within the jurisdiction of this
· state shall be entitled to full and equal accommodations .•• facilities and privileges •.• of public conveyances on land and water •.• ," and that it shall be
unlawful t_o withhold any such accommodation on account of race, creed or
color. The Michigan Supreme Court upheld the conviction.3 On appeal, appellant contended that the Michigan statute as applied to foreign commerce violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. Held, affirmed.
Foreign commerce of such peculiarly local concern may be regulated by a state,
and the ~tatute does not impose an undue burden on foreign commerce. BobLo Excursion Co. 'lJ. Michigan, (U.S. I948) 68 S.Ct. 358 4
Appellant relied upon two decisions of the Court which declared unconstitutional state segregation statutes as applied to interstate commerce. Hall 'lJ.
DeCuir 5 held unconstitutional a Louisiana law forbidding steamboats which
plied the Mississippi from segregating passengers according to race. Morgan 'lJ.
Virginia 6 held unconstitutional a Virginia law requiring segregation of passengers on interstate buses. Both cases turned on the point that such regulation by
a state interfered with the uniformity essential for the movement of carriers in
interstate commerce and constituted an undue burden on interstate commerce.
The principal case is distinguishable and does not involve the problem of segregation. 7 The issue here is discrimination, an issue not involved in the segregation
cases for the reason that substantially equal transportation accommodations were
furnished. The burden on commerce is quite different. The Michigan statute,
requiring only that the carrier furnish transportation to persons of the Negro
race indiscriminately with others, imposes no undue burden on the carrier
within the meaning of the term as used by the Court in past decisions. 8 The
1
The island is bui fifteen miles from Detroit, and is "economically and socially,
though not politically, an amusement adjunct of the city of Detroit." Principal
case at 362.
2
Mich. Comp. Laws (Supp. 1940) §§ 17u5-146, 17u5-14.7; Mich. Stat. Ann.
(Supp. 1946) §§ 28.343, 28.344.
8
317 Mich. 686, 27 N.W. (2d) 139 (1947).
4
Concurring opinion by Justice Douglas joined by-Justice Black; Justice Jackson
and Chief Justice Vinson dissented.
5
95 U.S. 485 (1877).
6
328 U.S. 373, 66 S.Ct. 1050 (1946). Noted in 45 MICH. L. REv. 209
(1946).
7
See on this subject Jones, "The Supreme Court's Role in Jim Crow Transportation," 3 NAT. B.J. II4 (1945.); and note in 45 MICH. L. REv. 209 (1946).
8
As to the meaning of undue or unreasonable burden in this class of cases, see
Southern Pacific R. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 65 S.Ct. 1515 (1945); Morgan
v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 66 S.Ct. 1050 (1946).

RECENT DECISIONS

danger of unreasonable burden resulting from diverse and conflicting state laws,
a point emphasized in the segregation cases, is not present in the principal case.
Of significance on this point is W concurring opinion of Justice Douglas who
declares that no state, nor the federal government, has the power to enact
discriminatory legislation which would require a carrier to deny transportation
to anyone because of race or color. 9 While a foreign government might enact
legislation conflicting with the Michigan statute, that possibility is remote in the
principal case because Canadian law 10 and policy is in accord therewith. To
Justice Douglas, the issue is simply the extent of the police power of a state to
prevent discrimination against its citizens, a power not challengeable on the facts
of the principal case.11 With regard to the power of a state to regulate foreign
commerce, the Court follows the doctrine first enunciated in Cooley 'lJ. Board
of Wardens 12 that absent federal legislation, a state may regulate foreign and
interstate commerce with respect to matters of local concern not requiring uniform national regulation. The foreign commerce in the principal case was of
peculiarly local concern. In view of the protective attitude evidenced by the
present Court toward civil liberties generally, and its decisions declaring unconstitutional state action which discriminated against colored persons,1 8 it is consistent policy to uphold a state statute forbidding discrimination. Although
seventeen other states have statutes 14 comparable to that of Michigan, the significance of the principal case would appear to be confined to similar fact situations. These statutes are inapplicable to carriers in interstate commerce for the
reason that federal legislation has occupied the field. The Interstate Commerce
Act 111 has been interpreted to preclude discrimination generally by carriers in
9

Any attempt by a state to bar colored persons from passage on public carriers,
says Justice Douglas, would invade a fundamental right guaranteed against state action
by the Fourteenth Amendment. Principal case at 365.
10
The Province of Ontario enacted in 1944 its Racial Discrimination Act,
Statutes of Ontario (1944) c. 51, p. 231.
11
See Railway Mail Assn. v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 65 S.Ct. 1483 (1945).
12
12 How. (53 U.S.) 298 (1851). The Court points out that the Cooley case
dealt indiscriminately with foreign and interstate commerce. Most of the cases following
this decision and upholding state regulation of foreign commerce deal with pilotage
statutes. See Pacific Mail Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. (69 U.S.) 450 (1865);
Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332, 25 S.Ct. 52 (1904). See also Kelly v. Washington,
302 U.S. 1, 58 S.Ct. 87 (1937).
18
See for example, Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 59 S.Ct.
232 (1938); Sipuel v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, (U.S. 1948)
68 S.Ct. 299; cf. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 62 S.Ct. 164 (1941). Interesting articles on this general subject are: Waite, "The Negro in the Supreme Court,"
30 MINN. L. REv. 219 (1946); and Baker, "Trend of United States Supreme Court
Decisions as Affecting Negroes' Rights," I NAT. B.J. 30 ( 1941).
14
See principal case at 360, note 10. The statutory citations are given in Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 at 382, note 24, 66 S.Ct. 1050 (1946). Some of these
statutes can be construed to prevent racial segregation as well as discrimination and
were thus discussed in Morgan v. Virginia, supra, which dealt exclusively with
segregation.
111
Section 3(1) of the Interstate Commerce Act [49 U.S.C. (1940) § 3(1)]
provides that "It shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

interstate commerce. 16 There is, however, no federal legislation dealing with
discrimination by carriers in foreign commerce. How far such state regulation
will be upheld where the foreign commerce is not of such local character, or in
the event of conflict with a foreign law, is left to future decision.
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this act ••• to subject any particular person .•• to any undue or unreasonable prejudice
or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever." 49 U.S.C. (1940) § 484 (b) extentls this
provision to carriers by air, and 49 U.S.C. (1940) § 905(c) to water carriers.
16 Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80, 61 S.Ct. 873 (1941), held that the
•
Interstate Commerce Act prohibited discrimination against colored passengers in interstate commerce.

